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Abstract
The sheer existence of EUR/CHF put options with strike prices below the EUR/CHF 1.20 floor,
trading at non-zero cost, challenged the full credibility of the Swiss National Bank (SNB) in enforcing
the lower barrier implemented in September 6, 2011 and abandoned on January 15, 2015. We
estimate the risk-neutral break probabilities of a realignment of the floor from market prices of
put options, using an extension of the Veestraeten option pricing model which assumes that the
underlying security price exhibits a lower barrier. We estimate probabilities considerably different
from zero, even when the exchange rate traded far above the EUR/CHF 1.20 floor. We observe
a drastic increase in the break-probabilities after August 2014, reaching a level of nearly 50%.
The credibility of the SNB in maintaining the floor, as seen from the option market, was thus
substantially lower than publicly claimed.
Keywords: currency options, central banking, credibility, Euro/Swiss franc floor, Vanna-Volga
method, barrier
JEL Classification: E42, E58, F31, G13
IThe first and second version of this paper were written in 2013 and 2014, when the EUR/CHF exchange
rate floor was effective. During the process of updating the study, in January 2015, the Swiss National Bank
abandoned the floor. The present version of the paper not only includes the updated results, but made it
necessary to adjust the wording concerning the “credibility” of the floor. Financial support was provided by
the Fo¨rdergesellschaft of the WWZ, which is gratefully acknowledged. The comments of Martin Andreasen,
Axel Kind, Yvan Lengwiler, Christian Kleiber and Evert Wipplinger were very helpful in improving the
paper. A previous version of this paper was presented at the 7th CFE-ERCIM Conference at the London
School of Economics in 2013.
1. Introduction
This paper uses put option prices to empirically analyze the credibility of the EUR/CHF
exchange rate floor maintained by the Swiss National Bank (SNB) from September 6, 2011
to January 15, 2015, when the floor was unexpectedly abandoned, as most market observers
claimed. The SNB got never tired to insist that it was willing to buy an unlimited amount
of Euros to maintain the floor. But the currency options market told a different story:
the sheer existence of EUR/CHF put options with strike prices below the EUR/CHF 1.20
floor1 trading at positive prices throughout the time period implies that financial market
participants questioned the SNB’s credibility to enforce this rate. But how strong were these
concerns?
We estimate implied risk-neutral probabilities that the exchange rate falls below the
EUR/CHF 1.20 floor (called “break” probability in this paper) within one, 3, and 12 months;
we use an extension of the option pricing model of Veestraeten (2008), respectively Hertrich
and Veestraeten (2013), which extends the Black-Scholes model by assuming an exchange
rate that follows a geometric Brownian motion with a reflecting barrier.2 In our context, this
model allows for a realignment of the prevailing floor to a lower level, i.e. in the model it is
assumed that options are priced with a credible reflecting exchange rate barrier below the
current floor, specifically, below the exercise prices for which positive put option prices are
observed in the market. This means that some investors anticipate a realignment of the floor
with non-zero probability.3 Furthermore, the difference between the implied and the current
exchange rate can be used as a direct measure of the credibility of the Swiss exchange rate
1Although we analyze the exchange rate from a CHF perspective in this paper, i.e., the number of units
of Swiss francs needed to buy one Euro or a floor of 1.20 Swiss francs per Euro, respectively, the exchange
rate is referred to as “EUR/CHF” in the body of the text, following the foreign exchange market convention
(see Reiswich and Wystup (2010), among others).
2The same assumption has previously been used by Gerber and Pafumi (2000) and Ko et al. (2010) for
the dynamics of an investment fund.
3In the retrospective, given the complete abandonment of the floor in January 2015, this assumption does
not seem to be adequate, but this should not be relevant from an ex-ante perspective. In particular, other
alternatives to a removal or a realignment of the floor were discussed as well, most notably a pegging of the
Swiss franc to a currency basket. See e.g. Bernholz (2015).
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policy vis-a-vis the Euro.
The subject of this paper is closely related to a study by Jermann (2015). The underlying
economic model is however different: the (unobservable) exchange rate upon which options
are priced represents the expected value over two regimes of next period’s exchange rate,
one with a minimum floor policy and one without. Jermann’s model therefore allows for a
positive probability that the SNB terminates its monetary regime before the options expire.
This introduces an option-like payoff profile into the exchange rate and can be priced by a
compound-option style model.4 Although the models differ, it is interesting to compare the
implications of the empirical findings with respect to the credibility of the SNB’s exchange
rate policy.
Notice that option-implied break-probabilities are, without further assumptions, risk-
neutral probabilities which can be interpreted as the risk-adjusted beliefs of market partic-
ipants about the stability of the exchange rate regime. Given the overall small currency
premium on exchange rate risk5 risk-neutral probabilities do not differ substantially from
their statistical counterparts.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 contains a brief description of the model,
the data and the estimation methodology. Section 3 contains the empirical results and a
comparison to Jermann’s findings. Section 4 summarizes the paper.
2. Methodology, Data, and Estimation
Option pricing model with reflecting barrier. We assume that, within an option’s maturity,
the market participants anticipate a decrease of the exchange rate barrier b to a level below
4A similar although less general model has been used to analyze the EUR/CHF case by Hanke et al.
(2015); they assume that the observed exchange rate is composed of a shadow exchange rate that would
prevail without the SNB’s stabilization policy plus the price of a European put option on the shadow exchange
rate with a strike price equal to the EUR/CHF 1.20 floor.
5De Santis and Ge´rard (1998) document small risk premiums for currency risk in international capital
markets. Specifically, for currencies within the European Monetary Union (EMU), De Santis et al. (2003)
estimate that the introduction of the Euro is unlikely to have affected the size of currency risk premiums and
therefore remain small. Moreover, Svensson (1992) shows theoretically that in target zone regimes, such as
the one analyzed here, currency risk premiums are small.
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the EUR/CHF 1.20 floor and below the strike price X. For this purpose, we use a model based
on a reflected geometric Brownian motion, where the assumption is that the lower barrier
b of the process is fully credible. This means that whenever the exchange rate touches the
floor, the exchange rate only prevails for an infinitely short time period on the floor in order
to avoid arbitrage opportunities that would otherwise arise (see e.g. Ingersoll Jr. (1987) on
p. 270 or Bergman (1996)). Apparently, the model provides only non-zero put option prices
for strike prices set above the floor level.
A stock option pricing model based on this process has been developed by Veestraeten
(2008), and was corrected for put options by Hertrich and Veestraeten (2013). The model al-
lows to estimate the implied barrier from market prices, under specific assumptions regarding
the volatility of the underlying security. The original version of this model, however, does not
assume a perpetual flow of dividends proportional to the level of the contemporaneous stock
price, which is equivalent to a constant, continuously compounded rate of interest on the
foreign currency when the underlying security is an exchange rate. The adjusted Veestraeten
model for put options with X > b is then6
Pˆ ≡ P (X,St, r, rf , σ, τ, b)t;X>b
= X exp−rτ Φ
(−z1 + σ√τ)− S∗t Φ (−z1)− b exp−rτ Φ (−z3 + σ√τ)
+S∗t Φ (−z3) +
1
θ
{
b exp−rτ ·Φ (−z3 + σ√τ)− S∗t ( bSt
)1+θ
·{Φ (z4)− Φ (z2)} −X exp−rτ
(
X
b
)θ−1
Φ
(
z2 − θσ
√
τ
)}
,
= P (X, ·)− P (b, ·) + 1
θ
{
b exp−rτ Φ
(−z3 + σ√τ)
−S∗t
(
b
St
)1+θ
{Φ (z4)− Φ (z2)} −X exp−rτ
(
X
b
)θ−1
Φ
(
z2 − θσ
√
τ
)}
, (1)
6The detailed derivation is available in an Appendix available from the authors.
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with
τ = T − t,
S∗t = St exp
−rf τ ,
θ = 2
(
r − rf)
σ2
,
z1 =
ln (St/X) +
(
r − rf + σ2/2) τ
σ
√
τ
,
z2 =
ln (b2/[StX]) +
(
r − rf + σ2/2) τ
σ
√
τ
,
z3 =
ln (St/b) +
(
r − rf + σ2/2) τ
σ
√
τ
,
z4 =
ln (b/St) +
(
r − rf + σ2/2) τ
σ
√
τ
,
where X is the strike price of the option contract, St is the EUR/CHF spot exchange rate
(denoted in Swiss francs per Euro), and r (rf ) are the annual continuously compounded risk-
free interest rates of the domestic (foreign) currency, respectively; σ is the constant annualized
volatility of the non-reflected geometric Brownian motion; τ is the time to maturity in years,
and Φ(·) denotes the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution.
Notice that P (X, ·) and P (b, ·) denote the Garman-Kohlhagen (GK) put prices7 with strike
prices X and b, respectively:
P ≡ P (X,St, r, rf , σ, τ)t = X exp−rτ Φ (−d2)− St exp−rf τ Φ (−d1) , (2)
with d1 = z1 and d2 = d1 − σ
√
τ .
Data. Standardized FX options are mainly traded over-the-counter (OTC) as part of the
overall foreign exchange and money market trading desk of banks. There are exchange-
traded currency options in the US, but the OTC market is much more relevant for the
7The GK model is the currency option equivalent to the Black-Scholes model for stock options and relies
on a standard geometric Brownian motion for the exchange rate dynamics.
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EUR/CHF exchange rate analyzed here.8 We retrieve the option data from Bloomberg for
the time period from September 06, 2011 to January 14, 2015.
In FX option markets, it is standard to quote option prices in terms of GK-model implied
volatilities for each maturity (Reiswich and Wystup, 2010).9 Moreover, the volatilities of out-
of-the money options are quoted on a “delta” basis; this means that they are not extracted
from contracts with specific fixed strike prices (as in the case of equity options), but from
contracts where the strike price is continuously reset such that a specific constant GK option
delta is maintained. The idea is to keep the “moneyness” of the contracts constant over
time and to make the quotes comparable. Bloomberg releases GK-implied volatilities for
two deltas, -10% and -25%. In the subsequent analysis, we will only use the 25∆ data, and
contract maturities of τ ∈ {1 month, 3 months and 12 months}, most results however relying
on 3 month (3m) contracts. We use the corresponding CHF LIBOR and EUR LIBOR interest
rates as risk-free interest rates.
Empirical implementation. In the empirical estimation of the model, we set the observed
market prices equal to the theoretical Veestraeten prices and solve Equation (1) numerically
for the implicit barrier level b. This apparently requires a specific assumption about the
underlying volatility: We assume that investors use the previous day’s implied volatility as
an estimate for today’s implied volatility, following Whaley (1993), Bakshi et al. (1997),
among others. The high forecasting power of this procedure has recently been compared to
alternative measures by, e.g., Satchell (2007) and Wang and Daigler (2011). The volatility
smile effect is captured by applying the Vanna-Volga estimation procedure, thereby getting
implied volatilities as of time t that are consistent with the previous day’s smile curve.10 We
8There is little information on trading volumes of OTC forex option markets. The latest available data
from the BIS’s Triennial Central Bank Survey in April 2013 show that the CHF is the second most actively
traded currency vis-a-vis the EUR, with a share of 11%.
9Details about how put and call option implied volatilities are derived from active market quotes can be
found in Castagna and Mercurio (2005), among others.
10More details about the Vanna-Volga method can be found e.g. in Castagna and Mercurio (2007), Wystup
(2010) and Bossens et al. (2010).
6
approximate the volatility level σ for the option price Pˆ with strike price X in Equation (1) as
of time t using the previous day’s price information, i.e., the strike prices X1 = X25∆P , X2 =
XATM , X3 = X25∆C of the option contracts with a maturity τ of three months, the risk-free
interest rates r, rf and the volatility levels σ25∆P , σATM and σ25∆C as of time t − 1. Notice
that the subindices 25∆P,ATM and 25∆C denote put options with an option delta of -25%,
at-the-money options, and call options with an option delta of 25%, respectively. We apply
the Vanna-Volga approximation proposed by Castagna and Mercurio (2005) in their equation
(12), p. 44, and set σ = σATM , for estimating the implied volatility σ
V V .
Based on the VV-implied volatility, the implied barrier level b can be numerically com-
puted. As the Veestraeten put pricing formula is a continuous and decreasing function in b,
the bisection method can be applied.11
In a final step, the risk-neutral exercise probabilities for X > b, denoted by pˆi are derived
by
pˆib =
∫ X
b
f (ST , St, r, σ, τ, b) dST ,
= Φ
(−z1 + σ√τ)− (X
b
)θ−1
Φ
(
z2 − θσ
√
τ
)
, (3)
where f (ST ) denotes the risk-neutral density function (or transition function) for a reflected
geometric Brownian motion process. The first term equals the risk-neutral probability of
option exercise for X > −∞ in the GK model (Equation (2)). Consequently, the second
term, which is negative, shows the effect of the lower reflecting barrier on the risk-neutral
cumulative density function. The risk-neutral break probability pˆi1.20 of the exchange rate
dropping below the EUR/CHF 1.20 floor follows by setting X = 1.20 in z1 and z2.
11For a given volatility level, we choose one price above and one price below the observed market price, and
then repeatedly narrow the interval successively to find the floor level b which supports the observed prices.
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3. Empirical Results
3.1. Implied Floor b
The empirical estimates for the implied floor level are displayed in Figure (1) and shows
substantial variation within the range of EUR/CHF 1.10 and EUR/CHF 1.20 for most part of
the observation period, with an overall positive trend up to August 2014, which implies that
the credibility for maintaining the floor improved over time. The positive trend benefited, in
particular, from the announcement of the unlimited bond buying program by the president
of the ECB on September 6, 2012 (the “Draghi put” option) to strengthen the Euro, and
from the revaluation of the Euro with respect to the Swiss franc in January 2013, when the
implied floor b reached levels close to the EUR/CHF 1.20 floor. The floor started to decline
sharply after August 2014, which may have been related to the statements of Draghi at the
Jackson Hole conference (August 22, 2014) where he alluded to implement “unconventional
instruments” to raise inflationary expectations over the medium- to long-term.
[Insert Figure (1) here]
The figure also reveals another interesting episode in the period from April to September
2012: while the EUR/CHF exchange rate remained close to the EUR/CHF 1.20 floor, the
implied floor shows substantial variability. It demonstrates how option markets reflect valu-
able information when spot markets are impeded in doing so. A substantial decrease of the
floor can be observed on May 25, 2012, when the Spanish bank Bankia received a 19 billion
Euro bailout, and a strong recovery of the implied floor happened after June 9, 2012, when
the European community decided to grant Spain a financial support package of 100 billion
Euro.
Overall, our analysis highlights the use of the modified Veestraeten model for extracting
important information from market prices to gauge the changing attitude of financial market
participants towards the credibility of central banks under a strong-side convertibility under-
taking. As illustrated in Figure (1), the spread between the estimated lower barrier b and
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the targeted floor of EUR/CHF 1.20 can be regarded as a direct market-based measure of
central bank credibility,12 an approach which can be applied whenever central banks operate
in target zones, even for the case of a unilateral target zone.
Notice, however, that the credibility argument is somehow flawed outside the target zone;
the increased implied floor b may then simply reflect the increased exchange rate (through the
decrease of the put option price) without being related to the central bank’s credibility. Of
course, this depends on whether the fluctuation of the exchange rate is regarded as part of the
bank’s credibility or not. Depending on which perspective one takes, one may alternatively
gauge the spread between the estimated lower barrier b and the actual exchange rate St as
a measure of central bank credibility. These two spreads are displayed in the lower part of
Figure (1).
3.2. Implied Risk-Neutral Break Probabilities pˆi1.20
Based on the previous implied lower barrier estimates b, Equation (3) can be used to
compute the implied risk-neutral break probabilities pˆi1.20, which are displayed in Figure (2):
[Insert Figure (2) here]
The solid line represents the probabilities implied by the 3m-contracts. Not surprisingly, the
introduction of the floor in September 2011 helped the Euro to gain credibility vis-a-vis the
Swiss franc: the break probabilities decreased from 50% to below 40% towards the end of
that year, but increased again to 50% towards the second quarter of 2012. It was not until
September 2012 (in the aftermath of the announcement of the “Draghi put”) that the market
perceived the SNB’s ability to defend the floor as more credible. It is interesting to notice
that the sharp drop of the probability did not occur at the first announcement of Draghi’s
plans in London on July 27, 2012, but only after the details of the program were announced
on September 6. This observation underpins the credibility and reputation of the ECB has
12Similarly, Rangvid and Sørensen (2001) use the difference between their shadow exchange rate and the
market rate for measuring the currency misalignment or the credibility of a target zone.
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as a key player in the financial system. As a consequence, the risk-neutral break probabilities
decreased sharply to some 35%. In January 2013, the revaluation of the Euro lowered the
break probabilities substantially, but the time period up to August 2014 was characterized
by huge fluctuations between zero and 30%. Occasionally, the probability decreased to zero
(end of May, mid-October, end of November 2013, and in early January 2014). The situation
changed drastically in August 2014 when the break probability jumped to 40%, and even
further up to 50% between October and November; it remained at that level until the floor
was abandoned by the SNB on January 14, 2015.
In Figure (2), we also add our estimates from 1m- and 12m-contracts. The spread between
the probabilities varies substantially over time. Interestingly, even in time periods of high
credibility, when the 1m-probability is essentially zero, does the 12m-estimate not fall much
below 30%. Towards the end of the regime, the probabilities are very close together.
Overall, while the credibility of the exchange rate floor increased shortly after its intro-
duction and between early 2013 and mid 2014, the break probability of the floor remained
above 10% over most of the time period and was therefore far from negligible. The credibility
particularly worsened after Draghi’s speech at the Jackson Hole conference in late August
2014 and remained at levels around 50%. Accordingly, our results in Figure (2) indicate
that the SNB’s credibility to enforce the floor was far from perfect as seen from the currency
options market perspective.13 When the SNB abandoned the floor on January 15, 2015, this
came as a big surprise for the public and most market commentaries. But the information
from the option market, at least since mid-November of the preceding year, told a different
story: Our model implies that the observed option prices indicated a realignment of the floor
to approximately EUR/CHF 1.15 with a 50% chance within the next few months - not a
complete abandonment of the floor, however, as it actually happened.
13According to Bekaert and Gray (1998), an exchange rate target zone is only perfectly credible, if there
is zero probability of observing an exchange rate outside the target zone.
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3.3. A Comparison to Jermann’s results
The empirical findings of Jermann (2015) imply quarterly break probabilities in the range
of 5%-35% (with only very few cases at 50%), and a shadow exchange rate between EUR/CHF
1.03 and EUR/CHF 1.22. In general, our estimates imply higher break probabilities, espe-
cially in periods when fears of a break-up of the Eurozone emerged (e.g. in spring 2012) or
when the Eurozone debt crisis escalated (e.g. in summer 2012) before Draghi’s “put option”
calmed down markets - a period where the observed EUR/CHF exchange rate was close to
the floor. We find that in this period the credibility was rather low, whereas Jermann finds
that the probability of the SNB to maintain the floor was rather high. Similarly, since Oc-
tober 2014 our model indicates a substantial increase in the probability of a realignment of
the floor up to 50%, whereas Jermann’s model even indicates a decrease in the break prob-
ability (increase in the continuation probability) after October 2014 with estimates within a
range of 10% to 20%. However, notice that the results cannot be directly compared, because
Jermann’s model assumes that the floor is fully removed, while we assume that the floor is
reset to a lower, fully credible level. As a consequence, our implied floor has not the same
interpretation as his shadow exchange rate as well.
Moreover, notice that Jermann’s interpretation of high credibility from April 2012 through
September 2012 is at odds with the large spread he observes between the effective and the
shadow exchange rate during these months.14
4. Conclusion
The findings of this paper suggest that the credibility of the EUR/CHF floor was far from
being perfect on the side of the market participants for most of the time where the floor was
in place. While the estimated break-probabilities and implied floor levels reveal a general
increase in credibility in the aftermath of the announcement of Draghi’s “put option” in
14This spread has been previously used in the literature (see e.g. Rangvid and Sørensen (2001)) as an
indicator of the credibility of a target zone.
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September 2012, and improved furthermore in January 2013, the implied floor levels stayed
away from EUR/CHF 1.20 for most of the time and the break probabilities reveal substantial
variation between zero and 15% even in the time-period between May 2013 and January 2014
when the credibility was highest. The picture changed substantially after August 2014 when
the option market indicated a drop of the floor to EUR/CHF 1.15 with a break-probability
of almost 50%. This observation is in sharp contrast to the fact the the abandonment of the
floor on January 15, 2015, came as a “big surprise” for most observers.
Whether our findings result from a mechanical hedging behavior of, for example, institu-
tional investors or by active currency speculation of hedge funds and other entities, remains
open. Although CFTC’s commitment of traders reports (COT) separately reports commer-
cial and non-commercial open position for currency futures and options traded in the US,
this data is of little value for addressing this question: It does not separately report option
positions; the data does not include OTC option trades; and it does not address currencies
beyond the USD.
In general, our findings are relevant for monetary authorities. Back in the 1970s and early
1980s, the introduction of currency option trading was originally discussed among (European)
central banks from the perspective of enhancing the informativeness of the foreign exchange
market, and to be more specific, as a means to visualize the exchange rate uncertainty
anticipated by the market participants. Interestingly, no case is known where monetary policy
was explicitly tied to information extracted from option prices, although the benefits are
occasionally discussed (Breuer, 1999). Our results show that the market prices of liquid option
contracts, in connection with an option pricing model, convey important information about
a central bank’s ability to enforce credible policy actions. At least, market based information
should be contrasted with official statements by authorities or public commentaries, which
are often over-confident compared to the financial market’s opinion, as it was the case in the
EUR/CHF episode analyzed here.
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Figure 1: Implied EUR/CHF Exchange Rate Barrier based on the Modified
Veestraeten Model and the Vanna-Volga Implied Volatility and the Deviation of the
EUR/CHF FX Rate and the 1.20-Floor from the Implied EUR/CHF Exchange Rate
Barrier
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Notes: The figure shows the spot EUR/CHF exchange rate St (right axis), the estimated lower bar-
rier b (right axis) assuming a 1-day lagged Vanna-Volga implied volatility level σV V for EUR/CHF
3-month 25-delta put options and the deviation of the EUR/CHF FX rate St from the implied floor
b (left axis) and of the EUR/CHF 1.20 floor from the implied floor b (left axis), respectively, from
September 06, 2011 to January 14, 2015. The computations are based on the modified Veestraeten
pricing model, as described in the text. Data source: Bloomberg, Datastream.
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Figure 2: Risk-Neutral Break Probabilities based on the Modified Veestraeten Model
and the Vanna-Volga Implied Volatility
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Notes: The figure shows the estimated risk-neutral break probabilities pˆi1.20 for EUR/CHF 1-month,
3-month and 1-year 25-delta put options and the 1-day lagged Vanna-Volga implied volatilities
σV V , from September 06, 2011 to January 14, 2015. To distinguish the different break probabilities
according to the option contract’s time to maturity τ , these probabilities are denoted by pˆi1.20τ . The
computations are based on the modified Veestraeten pricing model, as described in the text. Data
source: Bloomberg, Datastream.
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